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Fourteenth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

(This report covers the week from 18 May through 24 May 1973)

This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense

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COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*

(This report covers the week from 18 May through 24 May 1973)

The Key Points

- Almost 3,000 additional combat troops were detected starting the infiltration trip south from North Vietnam during the week. All of these troops are headed for northern MR 1.
- Recent evidence suggests that for the past several months the North Vietnamese have been temporarily rotating a number of units out of South Vietnam's Quang Tri Province for rest and refitting. In at least one case, a regiment which we had speculated might be withdrawing from South Vietnam is still committed to the DMZ/Quang Tri area.
- NVA logistic activity in the northern portion of the Laos Panhandle has diminished as increasingly heavy rains begin to hamper operations. Heavy Communist logistic activity continued in the tri-border area and in northern South Vietnam, however, and substantial southward movements of weapons and ammunition were detected during the week in the North Vietnam Panhandle.

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The Details

NOTE: This is the fourteenth in a series of reports detailing recently received evidence of (a) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military materiel toward and into South Vietnam, and (b) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements.

A. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel

- l. The infiltration of regular combat personnel to northern MR l continued during the past week, as five new regular groups destined for that area were observed entering the pipeline in North Vietnam. The total strength of these groups is almost 3,000 personnel. In addition, one small group of civil and military specialists, who are also destined for the northern part of MR l, was observed departing North Vietnam.
- 2. Including these new groups, our present estimate of North Vietnamese personnel who have started the infiltration trip south since 27 January stands at 24,000. Total infiltration since the cease-fire now stands at about 49,000 personnel, including some 25,000 who were already in the pipeline and traveling south on 27 January. Of the total of 49,000, all but several thousand infiltrators have already reached their destination. (Annex II, contains a more detailed discussion of the information on infiltration which was received during the past week.)
- 3. Some evidence -- not yet conclusive -- indicates that the 52nd Regiment of the NVA 320B

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Infantry Division may be withdrawing from South Vietnam's Quang Tri Province to North Vietnam. This regiment was last identified in South Vietnam in late March 1973. While its movement, if confirmed, could represent a permanent relocation of the unit back to North Vietnam, it is more likely that the move is only a temporary rotation out of northern Quang Tri Province for purposes of rest and refitting. Other reporting indicates that since December of last year various regiments of this division have been temporarily rotated in this fashion.

4. A month ago, we reported inconclusive evidence that some elements of the NVA 304th Division had moved out of Quang Tri Province back to North Vietnam and we speculated that the Division might be withdrawing. The headquarters of the Division's 66th regiment has now been identified -- for the first time since December 1972 -- in the central DMZ area. This identification indicates that the unit was withdrawn only for rest and refitting, and that it continues to be committed to South Vietnam.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies Toward and Into South Vietnam and Laos

NVA logistic activity appears to be slowing down in the northern portions of the Laos Panhandle as increasingly heavy rains begin to hamper operations. A substantial flow of traffic was observed during the week on the principal north-south roads in this area, but at levels lower than those of the preceding week and well below those seen in late April. Increased activity, however, was detected in the tri-border area of southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia, where good evidence indicates that large quantities of supplies are continuing to move from Laos to NVA units in the central highlands of South Vietnam. A high level of Communist logistic activity also continued in northern South Vietnam, particularly in the western MR-1/Laos border area where sizable shipments of munitions were detected and large quantities are in storage. In addition, substantial logistic flows were observed

in southern North Vietnam, where large rail shipments of munitions were noted at Vinh, and heavy vehicle activity was evident south of Vinh in the southern part of the panhandle.


- 6. Evidence received during the week indicates that the headquarters of two major NVA logistics command and control authorities in the Laos Panhandle/northeastern Cambodia area moved eastward either toward or into South Vietnam. These moves may be only temporary and their meaning at this point is unclear. If they represent permanent shifts, however, they would be further evidence that the Communists are preparing to carry out an increasing proportion of their logistic activity within South Vietnam rather than in Laos.
- 7. The following instances of Communist logistic activity were observed in South Vietnam during the period. Activity observed in South Vietnam probably reflects supplies which have recently entered the country. (The map on the following page shows the roads and route numbers which appear below.)

a) the new road under construction south from Route 19 in GVN MR-2 had been extended another 10 miles in Darlac Province since it was last observed on A total of 60 miles have been constructed since Several of the recently detected segments are two lanes in width and run parallel to the original roadbed, indicating the road will have a substantial logistic capability.

b) The following activity was observed in the operational area of an NVA logistic unit which operates west of Khe Sanh and into the adjacent areas of the Laos pPanhandle:

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1)	the unit transported	25
	over 40 tons of munitions on 11 cargo vehicles. On that day, there were reportedly over 2,000 tons of cargo, mainly ordnance, remaining in storage at facilities under the unit's jurisdiction.	
2)	the unit received 11 cargo vehicles in its area which were carrying 38 tons of munitions from another logistic entity located in northern Quang Tri Province.	25
3)	the unit received 20 cargo vehicles transporting nearly 70 tons of ordnance.	2
4)	nearly 60 tons of weapons and ammunition were transported to the unit on 17 cargo vehicles arriving from northern Quang Tri Province.	25
5)	vehicles were active within the operational area of the unit.	25)
on F Prov brid	the North Vietnamese had eleted a 150 foot steel span bridge soute 9 in north-central Quang Trivince. This is the first steel see which has been observed under struction in any Communist-controlled of South Vietnam. (See map)	
was	a 350 foot, 14 span bridge being built, probably of timber, on	

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Route 616 south of Khe Sanh. (See map)

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- 48 cargo vehicles were e) observed on Route 9 immediately east of the Laos/South Vietnam border (36 eastbound, 3 westbound, 9 parked).
- 59 cargo trucks were obf) served on Route 9 between the Laos/ South Vietnam border and Dong Ha (25 eastbound, 3 westbound, 9 parked).
- 12 cargo trucks were seen g) parked along Route 1 north of Dong Ha.
- 2 cargo trucks were obh) served traveling south and 6 parked on Route 616, southwest of Khe Sanh.
- During the reporting period the following indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in southern Laos were noted. Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably involved supplies destined for South Vietnam.
 - The table below lists observed NVA a) vehicle activity on selected routes in the Laos Panhandle during the reporting period.*

	Route 99		Route 9211	Ro	ute 958
	2 (2-S)	32	(5-N, 12-S)		NC**
79	(25-N, 26-S)	11	(3-N, 3-S)	49	(8-N, 6-S)
	NC**	15	(7-N, 2-S)	11	(Parked)
56	(10-N, 9-S)	21	(5-N, 11-S)	52	(11-N)
16	(5-N, 2-S)	35	(26-N, 9-S)	77	(34-N, 1-S)
100	(54-N, 8-S)	64	(30-N, 9-S)	2	(1-N, 1-S)
40	(23-N, 11-S)	41	(16-N, 8-S)	98	(3-N, 0-S)

The first number in each entry is the total number of vehicles. Of these totals, the number of trucks moving north (N) or south (S) are noted in the parentheses after each total. The remainder of the vehicles detected were parked along the roadway at the time of observation.

^{* *} No coverage.

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
a) the major NVA logistic command operating in the North Vietnam Panhandle south of Dong Hoi was observed moving nearly 50 tons of rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle ammunition toward the south.

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b) a storage facility in the Vinh area received six railroad cars containing more than 135 tons of weapons and ammunition. Since 12 May, at least 335 tons of ordnance have been received at this facility.

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C. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since the Cease-fire

10. In South Vietnam, the total number of Communist initiated cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for the last week (18-24 May) are shown below:

Military Region		nce Ceasefire of Action	Last Week Level of	(18-24 May) Action
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
MR 1	937	3,102	23	81
MR 2	220	1,630	3	65
MR 3	347	2,189	10	83
MR 4	565	5,286	12	260
Totals	2,069	12,207	48(82) <u>1</u> /	489 (485) <u>1</u> /

1/ Denotes totals of previous week.

11. Some of these violations may have been initiated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The table above and the chart on the following page, however, do show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the cease-fire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated in objective fashion. In some cases, the Joint Military Commission (GVN/PRG) also reports violations of the cease-fire.

D. Combat Activity Initiated by Communist Forces in Laos during the Week from 18 through 24 May


- 12. Military activity in Laos remained low during the reporting period. The only noteworthy incidents occurred in the Sala Phou Khoun area of Lao Military Region II and the Muong Phalane area of Military Region III. Specific incidents included:
 - a) On 18 May the Pathet Lao forces in the Sala Phou Khoun area fired 50 rounds of howitzer and mortar fire on a Lao Army platoon-size patrol.
 - b) On 21 and 22 May, two NVA companies drove back a Lao Army company in an area 13 kilometers south of Muong Phalane. On 23 May, an estimated three NVA companies, supported by 50 rounds of 85mm field gun fire, again attacked the same Lao Army company.


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



CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(28 JANUARY 1973 TO THE PRESENT)











ANNEX II

Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese Personnel to the South

- 1. Five new regular combat infiltration groups --4010, 4011, 4012, 4013, and 4016 -- with an aggregate strength of nearly 3,000 troops were detected entering the pipeline at Vinh during the past week. With these groups, all of which are destined for northern MR 1, we have now observed a total of seven new regular groups departing North Vietnam during the past two weeks--following a hiatus of about two months. The detection of group 4016 permits the gap-filling of groups 4014 and 4015, with an estimated strength of 1,000. In addition, one special-purpose group -- also destined for MR Tri-Thien-Hue -- was detected in North Vietnam during the past week. As a result of these detections, our estimate of infiltration starts since 27 January now stands at some 24,000.
- 2. The following table lists those infiltration groups which were reported for the first time during the past week.

Infiltration Groups Initially Reported During the Past Week

Group Designator	Strength	Location	Date of Detection
4010	500	North Vietnam	18 May
4011	586	North Vietnam	19 May
4012	595	North Vietnam	20 May
4013	612	North Vietnam	21 May
4016	602	North Vietnam	24 May
QL 456	49	North Vietnam	20 May

^{1.} Estimated.

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